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Social  psychology  and  citizenship:  a  critical  perspective  
  
Eleni  Andreouli  
The  Open  University  
  




The  paper  advances  a  critical  social  psychological  approach  to  the  study  of  citizenship.  It  
builds  upon  recent  social  psychological  work  on  the  subject,  particularly  in  discursive  and  
rhetorical  psychology  but  also  other  critical  approaches  such  as  social  representations  
theory.  The  paper  also  borrows  insights  from  the  interdisciplinary  field  of  citizenship  studies  
in  order  to  conceptualise  citizenship  in  both  its  conventional  (enacting  well-­‐established  
scripts  of  political  action)  and  its  transformative  aspects  (making  rights  claims  that  are  
disruptive  of  established  scripts).  The  paper  is  divided  in  five  sections.  The  first  section  
considers  the  relationship  between  social  psychology  and  citizenship;  the  second  section  
offers  a  conceptualisation  of  citizenship  that  takes  under  consideration  citizens’  practices  
from  the  ground  up  and  constraints  posed  by  existing  norms  and  laws;  the  third  section  
considers  the  value  of  adding  citizenship  into  the  social  psychological  conceptual  toolkit.  
The  fourth  more  substantive  section  advances  a  critical  social  psychological  approach  to  
citizenship  which  focuses  on  the  study  of  the  different  ways  that  ‘ordinary’  political  actors  
engage  with  political  matters  in  the  mundane  practices  of  everyday  life.  The  last  section  
concludes  the  paper  and  makes  some  suggestions  for  future  directions,  such  as  the  study  of  
emerging  forms  of  citizenship  through  a  more  nuanced  examination  of  intersecting  political  
affiliations.  
  
1.  The  relationship  between  psychology  and  citizenship    
  
There  is  a  profound  relationship  between  psychology  and  citizenship.  In  his  1989  book  
Governing  the  Soul,  the  sociologist  of  knowledge  Nikolas  Rose  traced  the  role  of  ‘psy  
disciplines’  in  producing  human  subjects,  particularly  the  autonomous  subject  of  choice  and  
self-­‐realisation  of  the  end  of  the  20th  century  in  liberal  democracies.  The  critique  that  
psychological  theory  and  research,  especially  in  its  Anglo-­‐Saxon  tradition  (Farr,  1996),  has  
suffered  from  a  tendency  to  psychologise  social  phenomena  is  well-­‐established  (e.g.  De  Vos,  
2014).  What  is  more,  psychology  itself  has  been  consequential  in  producing  the  subject  as  
an  individual  that  is,  first  and  foremost,  a  free  and  active  agent.  This  has  implications  for  
how  citizenship  in  modern  liberal  democracies  is  understood  and  enacted:  
  
“The  political  subject  is  now  less  a  social  citizen  with  powers  and  obligations  deriving  
from  membership  of  a  collective  body,  than  an  individual  whose  citizenship  is  to  be  
manifested  through  the  free  exercise  of  personal  choice  among  a  variety  of  marketed  
options”  (Rose,  1989/1999,  p.  230).    
  
More  recently,  the  role  of  behavioural  economics,  drawing  on  the  behavioural  tradition  of  
psychology,  in  technologies  of  governance  (e.g.  ‘behaviour  change’  type  policies)  has  also  
started  to  be  examined  (Jones,  Pykett  &  Whitehead  2013).  Isin’s  (2004)  ‘neurotic  citizen’  
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further  illustrates  the  role  of  psychoanalytic  knowledge  in  producing  a  new  political  subject  
that  is  expected  to  self-­‐govern  by  managing  its  affect.    
  
The  examples  above  illustrate  not  only  the  intimate  links  between  the  discipline  of  
psychology  and  citizenship,  through  the  psychologisation  of  society  and  the  
governmentalisation  of  the  state,  but  also,  more  broadly,  the  necessity  of  exploring  
citizenship  as  a  phenomenon  that  manifests  itself  both  in  societal  norms,  institutions  and  
structures  and  in  psychological  subjectivities  and  intersubjective  relations.  This  would  
suggest  that  social  psychology  is  ideally  placed  to  study  citizenship.  However,  this  has  
largely  not  been  the  case.  As  just  one  example,  the  2017  896-­‐page  Oxford  Handbook  of  
Citizenship  (Shachar  et  al.,  2017)  does  not  contain  any  social  psychological  contributions.  
Similarly,  social  psychology  handbooks  do  not  include  citizenship  as  a  topic  of  study  and  
citizenship  does  not  usually  feature  in  their  subject  index  (e.g.  Deaux  &  Snyder,  2012;  
Kruglanski  &  Higgins,  2007;  Hogg  &  Cooper,  2007).  Nevertheless,  there  has  historically  been  
some  social  psychological  work  on  the  topic  and,  more  recently,  citizenship  has  emerged  as  
a  subject  of  renewed  interest  in  the  discipline.  
  
In  their  review  of  social  psychological  literature  on  citizenship,  Stevenson,  Dixon,  Hopkins  
and  Luyt  (2015)  observe  that  citizenship  research  has  early  roots  in  social  psychology  (see  
also  Loredo-­‐Narciandi  &  Castro-­‐Tejerina,  2013),  reflecting  early  scholars’  (such  as  Gordon  
Allport’s)  interest  in  enhancing  citizens’  democratic  participation.  While,  in  the  context  of  
the  broader  de-­‐politicisation  and  individualisation  of  the  discipline,  these  critical  concerns  
did  not  flourish  at  the  time,  there  has  been  some  work  on  citizenship  in  the  discipline.  
According  to  Stevenson  et  al.  (2015),  this  has  concentrated  in  three  areas:  organisational  
psychology  (which  studies  issues  such  as  citizenship  behaviour  in  organisations),  community  
psychology  (with  studies  on  active  participation  in  community  settings),  and  constructionist  
citizenship  (which  examines  how  citizenship  is  actively  constructed  in  discourse).  
  
In  her  oft-­‐cited  2011  introduction  to  a  special  issue  on  social  psychology  and  citizenship,  
Condor  made  a  case  for  developing  a  social  psychology  of  citizenship.  Condor  argued  that  
longstanding  social  psychological  interests  and  concepts  (such  as  group  conflict,  social  
cohesion,  and  identity,  to  name  a  few)  are  very  relevant  to  the  concept  of  citizenship  and  
that  a  social  psychology  that  studies  “the  tensions  inherent  in  everyday  understandings  
and  experiences  of  citizenship  in  concrete  social  encounters”  (p.  197)  is  a  fruitful  avenue  of  
research.  Condor’s  was  not  the  first  special  issue  on  the  topic  (see  Sanchez-­‐Mazas  &  Klein,  
2003),  but  it  did  seem  to  spark  a  growing  interest  in  the  social  psychological  study  of  
citizenship.  It  is  telling  that  two  more  social  psychological  special  issues  on  citizenship  have  
since  been  published  (Stevenson  et  al.,  2015;  Xenitidou  &  Sapoutzis,  2018).  Papers  in  these  
special  issues  range  a  variety  of  topics,  but  identity  construction  and  exclusionary  practices  
(for  example,  in  contexts  of  immigration  and  inter-­‐cultural  and  inter-­‐ethnic  relations),  have  
been  at  the  forefront.    
  
This  more  recent  work  in  the  social  psychology  of  citizenship,  inspired  by  Condor  (2011)  and  
also  Haste’s  (2004)  earlier  work,  generally  falls  under  a  constructionist  approach.  This  
approach  studies  the  contested  nature  of  the  meanings  and  practices  of  citizenship  from  the  
perspectives  of  citizens  themselves.  This  will  be  the  focus  of  this  paper  and  it  will  be  
elaborated  in  the  fourth  section  of  this  paper.  In  the  third  section,  I  explain  why  citizenship  
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might  be  usefully  incorporated  into  the  conceptual  toolkit  of  social  psychology.  In  the  
second  section  that  follows,  I  consider  what  is  meant  by  citizenship,  focusing  on  the  
dynamics  between  convention  and  transformation.    
  
2.  Conceptualising  citizenship:  conventional  and  transformative  aspects    
  
Citizenship  does  not  have  an  agreed  upon  definition.  The  debates  surrounding  the  definition  
of  citizenship  have  been  helpfully  summarised  by  Condor  (2011)  in  terms  of  four  axes:  
boundaries  of  citizenship  (its  relation  to  other  related  concepts),  dimensions  of  citizenship  
(e.g.  civil,  political  and  social  citizenship  rights,  as  in  Marshall’s  (1964)  well-­‐known  work),  
models  of  citizenship  (e.g.  liberal  and  communitarian  definitions),  and  criteria  of  
membership  of  the  polity  (e.g.  jus  soli  and  jus  sanguinis).    
  
What  most  theorisations  of  citizenship  share  is  a  focus  on  the  nation-­‐state.  Citizenship  is  
routinely  seen  as  citizenship  of  the  nation-­‐state  and  it  is  studied  in  terms  of  the  state  
institutions  that  support  it.  This  is  not  surprising  given  the  ‘banality’  (Billig,  1995)  of  
considering  the  nation  as  a  natural  form  of  community  and  the  nation-­‐state  as  the  ultimate  
form  of  political  organisation.  This  is  however  problematic  for  several  reasons.  Firstly,  
nation-­‐states  are  in  reality  multi-­‐national  and  multi-­‐ethnic,  so  equating  citizenship  with  
national  citizenship  reproduces  the  myth  of  the  homogeneous  nation  that  is  neatly  aligned  
with  the  body  politic  (Cohen,  1999).  Also,  while  it  is  true  that  many  struggles  over  
citizenship  have  to  do  with  contests  over  the  definitions  of  national  membership  (e.g.  in  
immigration  politics),  the  national/non-­‐national  distinction  is  not  the  only  source  of  political  
exclusion  nor  the  only  stake  in  citizenship  rights  struggles.  Some  examples  of  differentiated  
forms  of  citizenship  (Young,  1989)  are  sexual  citizenship,  ecological  citizenship  and  
multicultural  citizenship,  each  of  which  corresponds  to  a  different  set  of  rights  claims  and  a  
different  nexus  of  political  interests  as  well  as  different  sites  of  political  struggle  (e.g.  in  the  
intimate  sphere  in  sexual  citizenship;  see  Lister,  2007).  Finally,  a  state-­‐centred  approach  to  
citizenship  places  undue  emphasis  on  state  actors  and  tends  to  neglect  other  political  
actors,  most  notably,  citizens  themselves  (Andreouli,  Kadianaki  &  Xenitidou,  2016).  This  
latter  point  is  particularly  important  for  social  psychology  whose  raison  d'être,  in  all  its  
contested  variants,  is  precisely  to  study  phenomena  at  the  intersection  of  the  social  and  
individual  levels  of  analysis.  Ultimately,  top-­‐down  approaches  are  better  for  explaining  how  
political  arrangements  are  maintained  rather  than  how  they  might  change  from  the  ground  
up.    
  
Considering  these  issues,  citizenship  can  be  understood  as  relating  to  both  the  conventional  
(citizenship  as  enacting  one’s  status  by  conforming  to  rules  and  norms)  and  the  
transgressive/transformative  (citizenship  as  engaging  in  political  acts  which  seek  to  
challenge  the  status  quo).  The  former  refers  to  the  normative  and  legal  framework  that  
defines  who  is  a  citizen  (the  criteria  of  membership  in  a  polity)  and  what  rights  stem  from  
that  status  (the  ‘contents’  of  citizenship).  This  framework  can  be  understood  as  a  citizenship  
regime1.  Citizenship  regimes  are  embedded  in  political  histories  and  ideological  traditions  
which  can  make  them  very  hard  to  challenge.  For  example,  the  UK’s  laws  on  citizenship  and  
                                                                                                                
1  Citizenship  regimes  can  be  defined  as:  “institutionalized  systems  of  formal  and  informal  norms  that  define  
access  to  membership,  as  well  as  rights  and  duties  associated  with  membership,  within  a  polity”  (Vink,  2017,  
p.222).  
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integration  can  be  traced  back  to  the  country’s  imperial  roots  (Favell,  1998).  At  a  ‘lived’  
level,  from  the  perspectives  of  citizens,  conventional  citizenship  takes  the  form  of  habitus  
(Isin,  2009).  It  refers  to  enacting  one’s  status  in  an  established  political  field  by  acting  out  
already  existing  scripts  of  political  behaviour,  for  example,  participating  as  a  citizen  by  
voting  in  elections.    
  
But,  citizenship  is  both  about  invoking  and  about  breaking  conventions  (Isin,  2017;  Saward,  
2013).  Citizens  do  not  just  obey  the  rules;  they  can,  and  they  do,  contest  them.  They  also  
make  claims  about  the  meanings  and  scope  of  the  rights  they  hold  (e.g.  extending  marriage  
rights  to  gay  couples)  and  about  new  rights  they  want  established  (e.g.  the  ‘right  to  be  
forgotten’  in  the  digital  age).  As  Isin  (2017)  observes,  “citizenship  is  practiced  not  only  by  
exercising  [given]  rights,  but  also  by  claiming  them”  (p.  501).  In  that  sense,  citizenship  can  
take  the  form  of  acts,  which  are  disruptive  events  that  challenge  existing  scripts  (Isin,  2009).  
An  example  of  acts  of  citizenship  are  acts  of  civil  disobedience.  Through  acts  of  civil  
disobedience,  citizens  disrupt  established  scripts  of  citizenship  behaviour,  which  entail  
abiding  to  the  law.  By  making  new  claims  about  their  rights  as  citizens,  they  ultimately,  
contest  and  renegotiate  the  meanings  of  citizenship  itself.  One  such  case  is  the  ‘I  don’t  pay  
movement’  in  Greece  whereby  citizens  refused  to  pay  tolls  as  a  means  of  protesting  against  
austerity  measures  implemented  during  the  country’s  economic  crisis.  Not  paying  tolls  can  
be  seen  as  an  act  of  citizenship  in  that  it  challenges  the  norm  of  the  tax-­‐paying  citizen  as  the  
‘good  citizen’  and  instead  puts  forward  a  vision  of  citizenship  that  is  based  on  an  anti-­‐
austerity  agenda.  Citizenship  in  this  sense  is  performative  (Isin,  2017):  it  is  about  the  very  
act  of  making  rights  claims,  not  the  condition  of  holding  a  citizenship  status.  In  other  words,  
it  is  acting  as  a  citizen  that  constitutes  one  as  a  political  subject,  rather  than  one’s  status.  
Individuals  and  groups  who  are  not  formally  recognised  as  citizens  can  act  as  such  by  
engaging  in  acts  of  citizenship.  An  example  are  undocumented  migrants  who  organise  
themselves  politically  to  demand  more  rights  (e.g.  the  sans-­‐papiers  movement  in  the  1990s)  
and,  in  that  process,  they  challenge  and  transform  the  status  quo  that  marginalises  them  as  
non-­‐citizens.  Through  these  acts  of  citizenship,  migrants  constitute  themselves  as  citizens,  
that  is,  as  subjects  who  have  the  right  to  claim  rights  (Isin,  2009).    
  
3.  Adding  citizenship  to  the  conceptual  toolkit  of  social  psychology    
  
Citizenship  can  be  a  valuable  concept  for  social  psychologists  who  want  to  explore  the  
complex  dynamics  of  political  struggles  as  enacted  by  citizens  themselves  operating  within  
and  against  the  constraints  of  an  existing  political  field.  To  be  fair,  social  psychology  has  a  
history  of  studying  political  matters  (Andreouli  &  Figgou,  2019).  For  example,  the  study  of  
intergroup  relations  (Tajfel,  1982),  obedience  to  authority  (e.g.  Milgram,  1974),  and  social  
influence  (e.g.  Moscovici,  1976)  are  just  a  few  research  traditions  that  have  sought  to  
provide  solutions  to  important  political  questions,  such  as  the  rise  of  fascism  in  the  first  half  
of  the  20th  century.  Perhaps  social  identity  is  the  closest  social  psychological  term  to  
citizenship,  not  least  because  (national  of  other)  identity  can  function  as  the  ‘glue’  linking  
together  individuals  belonging  in  a  (national  or  other)  political  community.  This  is  certainly  a  
fruitful  area  of  research  along  with  many  others  in  social  psychology.  Nevertheless,  
citizenship,  as  a  concept  that  allows  us  to  theorise  how  social  agents  engage  with  political  
struggles,  can  broaden  the  field  of  vision  of  social  psychology  by  bringing  to  focus  the  study  
of  political  action  and  subjectivity  as  a  field  of  study  in  its  own  right.  Instead  of  ‘stretching’  
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social  psychological  concepts  to  do  the  work  of  citizenship,  we  can  instead  explore  the  
intersections  between  citizenship  and  related  social  psychological  concepts  (for  example,  
identity;  see  Isin  &  Wood,  1999;  Hopkins  &  Blackwood,  2011).  
  
The  study  of  citizenship  and  the  engagement  with  interdisciplinary  work  will  further  enable  
social  psychologists  to  reflect  on  our  own  disciplinary  assumptions,  particularly  our  
understanding  of  the  ‘social’.    The  meaning  of  the  ‘social’  in  social  psychology  has  taken  
many  forms,  and  it  is  often  the  subject  of  heated  debate  in  the  discipline.  For  example,  part  
of  the  1970s  ‘crisis’  in  social  psychology  were  debates  about  the  discipline’s  lack  of  
consideration  of  the  macro  social  context  (see  Faye,  2012).  In  addition  to  the  symbolic  field  
of  culture  and  ideology,  I  am  also  referring  here  to  the  importance  of  including  political  
structures  and  institutions  in  social  psychological  analyses,  which  were  described  in  Section  
2  above  as  citizenship  regimes.  Paradoxically  perhaps,  given  the  very  subject  matter  of  
social  psychology,  social  psychologists  often  neglect  to  incorporate  in  their  analyses  a  
serious  consideration  of  the  more  structural  level,  which  inevitably  comes  into  play  in  the  
study  of  citizenship  (Andreouli,  Kadianaki  &  Xenitidou,  2016).  A  side-­‐effect  of  this  neglect  is  
inadvertently  perpetuating  the  assumption  that  state  citizenship  policies  and  practices  are  
somehow  neutral  or  rational.    
  
Some  recent  social  psychological  work  has  explored  the  institutional  dimension  of  
citizenship.  For  instance,  Andreouli  and  Howarth  (2013),  in  their  study  of  migrants’  
experiences  of  naturalisation  in  the  UK,  have  shown  that  social  recognition  is  not  only  a  
matter  of  symbolic  representations  of  ‘us’  and  ‘them’  but  also  a  matter  of  the  very  tangible  
ways  that  boundaries  are  constructed  through  policies  and  practices  of  naturalisation.  For  
example,  the  mandatory  citizenship  ceremony  where  new  citizens  are  presented  with  their  
naturalisation  certificates  can  be  perceived  by  long-­‐term  residents  as  paternalistic  and  
condescending  so  that  it  puts  to  question  their  belonging.  This  shows  how  institutional  and  
symbolic  boundaries  can  intersect  but  also  be  in  tension  with  one  another.  Similarly,  the  
citizenship  test,  intended  to  promote  integration,  can  have  the  adverse  effect  of  positioning  
would-­‐be  citizens  as  ‘novices’  in  British  culture  (Gray  &  Griffin,  2014).  Research  on  
citizenship  will  invite  social  psychologists  to  analyse  in  more  detail  the  role  of  institutions  in  
how  citizenship  is  defined,  enacted  and  lived.  
  
There  is  also  a  more  ‘practical’  reason  for  engaging  social  psychologically  with  citizenship.  As  
observed  already  in  1994  by  Kymlicka  and  Norman  (see  also  Condor,  2011),  there  has  been  
an  explosion  of  research  on  citizenship  in  the  political  sciences,  from  which  social  
psychology  can  draw  upon  and  contribute  to.  The  call  for  the  study  of  citizenship  in  social  
psychology  is  not  simply  a  strategic  call  for  elevating  the  position  of  social  psychology  in  the  
academy.  The  ‘explosion’  of  citizenship-­‐related  work  in  the  social  sciences  reflects  the  
increased  relevance  of  the  concept  in  ‘real  life’.  We  seem  to  be  living  in  an  ‘era  of  
citizenship’  (Andreouli  &  Figgou,  2019)  where  political  struggles  are  played  out  as  struggles  
over  citizenship.  Understanding  the  different  ways  in  which  citizenship  is  understood,  
contested  and  enacted  is  crucial  at  times  when  politics  are  particularly  volatile  and  shifting  
against  established  trends  (such  as  following  the  election  of  Tump  in  the  USA,  the  5-­‐Star  
movement  in  Italy  and  Bolsonaro  in  Brazil).  
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4.  A  critical  social  psychological  perspective:  everyday  life  and  the  politics  of  common-­‐
sense    
  
In  this  section,  I  consider  what  a  critical  social  psychological  approach  can  contribute  to  
citizenship  studies.  I  argue  that  this  has  to  do  with  studying  the  different  ways  that  
‘ordinary’  political  actors,  i.e.  citizens  themselves,  engage  with  political  matters  in  the  
‘mundane’  practices  and  interactions  of  everyday  life.  I  first  explain  (i)  why  this  focus  on  
everyday  citizenship  is  needed,  and  then  (ii)  discuss  relevant  critical  social  psychological  
contributions.  
  
With  regards  to  the  first  point,  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  political  struggles  are  
increasingly  played  out  in  diverse  settings  that  are  outside  the  field  of  formal  state  politics,  
as  work  on  sexual,  gender  and  multicultural  citizenship,  for  example,  show.  Gender,  sexual  
and  intercultural  relations  have,  of  course,  to  do  with  institutional  recognition  of  rights  but,  
crucially,  they  also  relate  to  intersubjective  relations  that  are  developed,  managed  and  lived  
in  the  mundane  settings  of  everyday  life.  Citizenship  in  our  current  times  is  very  much  a  
lived  practice:  citizenship  rights  are  not  just  the  rights  that  are  enshrined  in  law  but  ‘living  
rights’  that  have  relevance  for  people’s  everyday  realities  and,  as  such,  they  are  mobilised,  
claimed  and  enacted  in  everyday  life  (Sanghera,  Botterill,  Hopkins  &  Arshad,  2018).  
  
The  politicisation  of  everyday  life  also  relates  to  the  fact  that,  under  neoliberalism,  
individual  citizens  are  called  upon  to  self-­‐manage  while  the  state  becomes  less  and  less  
involved  in  their  welfare.  An  example  of  this  is  social  citizenship.  In  the  UK,  for  example,  
welfare  become  increasingly  a  matter  of  personal  responsibility  and  less  so  a  matter  of  state  
provision.  Recipients  of  welfare  benefits,  recast  as  clients,  are  expected  to  be  individually  
responsible  for  managing  their  wellbeing  without  the  intervention  of  the  state  (Clarke,  
2005;  Stenner  &  Taylor,  2008),  ultimately  producing  new  forms  of  health  inequalities  
(Sparke,  2017).    
  
Given  this  emphasis  on  self-­‐management  that  places  political  matters  (such  as  welfare)  into  
the  realm  of  everyday  life,  it  is  perhaps  paradoxical  that  the  ideology  of  neoliberalism  at  the  
same  time  contains  the  assumption  that  we  live  in  a  post-­‐political  world  (Andreouli  &  
Figgou,  2019;  Glaser,  2018).  This  is  a  world  where  political  decisions  are  supposedly  made  
on  the  basis  of  neutral  cost-­‐benefit  calculations  instead  of  ideological  considerations.  An  
example  is  the  rhetoric  of  David  Cameron,  UK  Prime  Minister  from  2010  until  2017.  During  
his  premiership,  and  in  the  aftermath  of  the  global  financial  crisis,  Cameron  implemented  a  
series  of  severe  austerity  policies  to  reduce  the  UK’s  deficit.  In  defending  these  polices,  
Cameron  invoked  the  idea  that  the  “the  only  way  out  of  a  debt  crisis  is  to  deal  with  your  
debts”  drawing  a  parallel  with  the  ‘common-­‐sense’  of  lay  citizens  and  household  economics.  
‘Common-­‐sense’  knowledge  is  thus  portrayed  as  neutral  and  uncomplicated  and  it  is  co-­‐
opted  by  politicians  concealing  the  ideological  foundations  of  their  politics  (see  also,  
Weltman  &  Billig,  2001).  Whilst  citizens  are  being  increasingly  enrolled  into  politics  by  
governmental  strategies  that  encourage  self-­‐regulation  and  ‘active  citizenship’  (Neveu,  
2014),  at  the  same  time,  they  are  de-­‐politicised  (Clarke,  2010).  These  supposedly  consensual  
and  post-­‐ideological  politics  mask  antagonisms  and  limit  plurality  (Glaser,  2018;  Mouffe,  
1998).  
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Coming  on  to  the  second  point  above  (the  value  and  relevance  of  a  social  psychological  
contribution),  it  is  crucial  in  this  context  that  social  scientists  take  everyday  common-­‐sense  
seriously  as  a  topic  of  study.  Indeed,  calls  to  extend  the  scope  of  citizenship  studies  to  the  
study  of  the  ordinary  have  been  made  by  citizenship  studies  scholars  themselves  (Neveu,  
2014,  2015).  Social  psychology  can  contribute  substantially  towards  that  goal  through  
interdisciplinary  engagement  with  citizenship  studies.    
  
Tileagă  and  Byford  (2014)  argue  that  interdisciplinarity  should  be  transformative  rather  than  
confirmatory.  They  argue  against  selective  cherry-­‐picking  of  ideas  and  evidence  from  other  
disciplines  for  the  purpose  of  confirming  existing  work  within  a  discipline.  Interdisciplinarity  
should  encourage  us  to  work  harder  with  our  concepts  and  to  complicate  them  rather  than  
simplify  them.  This  is  what  Tileagă  and  Byford  (2014)  call  ‘conceptual  reflexivity’:  the  
process  through  which  we  revisit  and  reflect  on  the  value,  scope  and  use  of  existing  
concepts  in  light  of  insights  from  other  disciplines.    
  
Taking  this  under  consideration,  it  is  suggested  here  that  a  key  social  psychological  
contribution  to  citizenship  studies  is  to  complicate  the  concept  of  citizenship  to  include  the  
sphere  of  everyday  practice,  as  an  arena  where  citizenship  is  performed  in  different  ways  
both  contestatory  and  confirmatory.  This  has  two  important  implications  for  citizenship  
studies:  firstly,  it  urges  citizenship  scholars  to  pay  attention  to  citizens’  own  practices  of  
claims  making  which  emanate  from  the  ground  up  (contrary  to  the  traditional  focus  on  the  
state),  and,  secondly,  it  urges  them  to  not  just  study  citizenship  as  the  performance  of  
‘extraordinary’  acts  (as  more  recent  citizen-­‐oriented  approaches  have  very  fruitfully  
theorised  and  explored)  but  also  more  mundane  practices  through  which  citizenship  is  
defined,  claimed  and  contested.  Ultimately,  this  is  about  extending  the  field  of  the  political  
to  include  practices  widely  assumed  to  be  non-­‐ideological  and  non-­‐political.  
  
A  superficial  reading  of  this  argument  would  suggest  that  social  psychology’s  role  in  
citizenship  studies  is  to  conduct  public  opinion  research  to  uncover  what  citizens  think  
about  political  issues.  After  all,  attitudes  have  been  one  of  the  most  prolific  areas  of  social  
psychological  research.  Nevertheless,  public  opinion  research,  whilst  very  useful  in  mapping  
attitudes  across  large  populations,  does  not  fully  do  justice  to  the  approach  advocated  here.  
Public  opinion  research,  like  much  of  social  cognition,  is  based  on  a  ‘deficit  model’  of  lay  
knowledge  (Condor,  2016).  This  model  is  predicated  on  assumption  that  politics  constitute  a  
distinct  domain  that  requires  competences  that  are  not  available  to  (most)  lay  people  
(Condor,  2016).  The  ideal  democratic  citizen  is  someone  who  is  well-­‐informed  and  
ideologically  consistent  (Tileagă,  2013)  and,  as  this  ideal  is  hardly  reached,  citizens  are  very  
often  seen  as  ‘not  up  to  the  task’  of  politics.    
  
Social  psychology,  particularly  its  more  critical  variants  (such  as  the  theory  of  social  
representations  and  critical  discursive  psychology),  has  challenged  this  assumption  and  has  
sought  to  ‘rehabilitate’  common-­‐sense  as  a  type  of  knowledge  (Jovchelovitch,  2008).  From  
dismissing  it  as  a  form  of  knowing  that  is  prone  to  error,  but  also  ‘innocent’  and  a-­‐political,  
social  psychologists  have  studied  common-­‐sense  as  an  everyday  ‘practical’  form  of  
reasoning  that  enables  people  to  render  their  social  world  meaningful  and  to  relate  with  
others  on  the  basis  of  a  collectively  elaborated  system  of  ideas  and  values,  such  as  social  
representations  (Moscovici  &  Duveen,  2000).  Like  social  representations  scholars,  critical  
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discursive  psychologists,  more  geared  to  the  study  of  language  and  power,  have  consistently  
argued  for  the  detailed  study  of  common-­‐sense  –  both  the  ways  that  it  works  rhetorically  in  
micro-­‐interactions  as  well  as  its  ideological  underpinnings  and  functions  in  perpetuating  and  
challenging  cultural-­‐ideological  traditions  (Billig  et  al.,  1988;  Wetherell,  1998).    
  
The  rhetorical  social  psychological  approach  is  particularly  useful  in  the  social  psychology  of  
citizenship.  This  approach  conceives  of  citizens  as  argumentative  thinkers  (Billig,  1987),  who,  
instead  of  being  oriented  towards  closure  and  balance,  are  capable  of  thinking  through  
arguments  and  counter-­‐arguments.  The  supposed  incoherence  and  ambiguity  of  lay  
knowledge,  which  is  traditionally  seen  by  social  psychologists  as  a  flaw,  is  seen  by  rhetorical  
psychologists  as  the  basis  for  debate  and  dialogue  and,  thus,  as  the  seed  for  producing  novel  
ideas  (see  also,  Marková,  2003).  Furthermore,  from  this  perspective,  common-­‐sense  
thinking  is  inherently  ideological.  It  is  imbued  with  ideologies  –  these  can  be  understood  as  
‘lived’  ideologies  to  differentiate  them  from  the  ‘intellectual’  ideologies  of  ‘expert  thinkers’  
(Billig,  et  al.,  1988).  Lived  ideologies  are  dilemmatic  containing  themes  and  counter-­‐themes.  
An  example  is  ‘banal  nationalism’  (Billig,  1995),  which  contains  the  themes  of  both  
particularism  (that  ‘our’  nation  is  unique)  and  universalism  (that  ‘our’  nation  exists  within  an  
international  system  of  nation-­‐states).  Another  example  are  the  dilemmatic  tensions  
between  social  responsibility  and  individual  self-­‐interest  in  (neo)liberal  ideology  (Condor  &  
Gibson,  2007;  Hall  &  O’Shea,  2015).  The  ordinary  person,  therefore:  “is  not  a  blind  dupe,  
whose  mind  has  been  filled  by  outside  forces  and  who  reacts  unthinkingly.  The  subject  of  
ideology  is  a  rhetorical  being  who  thinks  and  argues  with  ideology”  (Billig,  1991,  p.  2).  
  
Considering  everyday  common-­‐sense  as  a  culturally  and  ideologically  embedded  system  of  
ideas  that  can  be  argued  upon,  debated  and  change,  allows  us  to  study  citizenship  as  a  
contested  practice  (Condor,  2011).  Taking  this  theoretical  stance,  we  can  conceptualise  
citizenship  as  an  everyday  practice  of  invoking  one’s  rights  and  making  rights  claims  that  
position  oneself  and  others  as  (legitimate)  political  subjects  but  which  may  also  exclude  
others  from  political  life.  Citizenship,  from  a  critical  social  psychological  perspective,  is  
therefore  about  how  ‘ordinary’  political  actors  make  sense  of,  negotiate,  contest  and  enact  
their  positions  as  rights  bearers  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  others.    
  
The  social  psychological  study  of  citizenship  advocated  here  focuses  on  the  dynamics  of  
claims-­‐making  practices  (Andreouli,  Kadianaki  &  Xenitidou,  2016).  As  Barnes,  Auburn  and  
Lea  (2004,  p.  189)  argue:  “It  is  something  of  an  oversimplification  to  assume  that  certain  
entitlements  unproblematically  flow  from  establishing  oneself  as  a  citizen…  what  really  
matters  is  the  very  process  of  negotiation,  contestation  and  dialogue  in  which  these  claims  
and  identities  are  mobilised.”  This  approach  chimes  with  recent  performative  approaches  to  
citizenship  (Isin,  2017),  because  they  both  conceive  of  citizenship  as  something  we  actively  
‘do’  through  claiming  and  disclaiming  rights  for  us  and  for  others,  not  just  something  we  
have.  Importantly,  however,  and  as  noted  above,  a  critical  social  psychological  angle  offers  a  
much-­‐needed  focus  on  the  sphere  of  the  everyday.  Citizenship  studies,  being  substantially  
informed  by  politics  and  sociology,  tend  to  focus  on  activism  when  considering  the  bottom-­‐
up  transformative  aspects  of  citizenship,  and  on  governance  institutions,  when  they  
consider  the  more  conventional  aspects  of  citizenship.  The  ‘ordinary’,  ‘mundane’  and  
‘everyday’  remain  therefore  underexplored  (Neveu,  2015).  This  is  a  key  reason  why  social  
psychology  can  provide  a  fresh  perspective:  because  it  studies  how  everyday  life  itself  is  not  
   9  
just  the  field  of  the  conventional,  but  also  a  domain  where  political  struggles  play  out  
(Howarth  and  Andreouli,  2016).  Studying  citizenship  from  this  perspective  means  exploring  
political  struggles  as  struggles  over  meaning.  The  politics  of  everyday  common-­‐sense  are  
about  the  discursive  struggles  over  who  has  the  power  to  institute  meaning  over  others.    
  
Kadianaki  and  Andreouli  (2015)  have,  for  example,  studied  how  citizenship  is  discursively  
constructed  in  online  public  debates  about  a  new  (more  civically-­‐oriented)  citizenship  law  in  
Greece.  They  showed  that  both  Greek  citizens  and  migrants  living  in  Greece,  whilst  
developing  different  lines  of  argument,  both  drew  on  an  essentialist  social  representation  of  
citizenship.  In  that  sense,  becoming  a  citizen  was  about  being  ethnically  Greek  and/or  being  
fully  immersed  into  the  Greek  culture  in  a  way  that  ‘compensates’  for  migrants’  lack  of  
ethnic  ties  with  the  country.  Another  example  of  critical  social  psychological  work  in  the  
field  is  social  citizenship.  Gibson  (2009),  in  his  analysis  of  online  discussions  around  welfare  
in  the  UK,  found  that  welfare  is  constructed  through  an  effortfulness  repertoire  which  
assesses  welfare  recipients  on  the  basis  of  their  level  of  individual  effort.  This  work  as  a  
whole  shows  the  workings  of  political  ideology  “in  process”  (Haste,  2004,  p.  415).  It  shows  
how  ideologies  (for  example,  liberal  individualism)  play  out  in  the  discursive  practices  of  lay  
interactions  and  the  broader  consequences  and  functions  of  these  ‘mundane’  practices  such  
as  (de-­‐)legitimating  political  inequalities  and  supporting  or  challenging  political  projects.    
  
Everyday  citizenship  is  also  placed  and  embodied.  Di  Masso  (2015),  in  his  research  on  public  
space  in  Barcelona,  has  studied  ‘locational’  acts  of  citizenship.  Di  Masso  has  argued  that  the  
use  of  public  space  in  everyday  life  involves  norms  of  what  constitutes  appropriate  
citizenship  behaviour  and  this,  in  turn,  involves  power  differentials  between  those  who  are  
socially  advantaged  and  disadvantaged  (e.g.  rough  sleepers).  The  (mis-­‐)use  of  public  space  
can  thus  be  conceived  as  a  political  act  which  can  invoke  and  support  citizenship  norms,  but  
it  can  also  transgress  and  challenge  the  social-­‐political  order.  This  can  be  seen,  for  instance,  
in  the  Occupy  movement  and  other  occupations  of  public  spaces  it  has  inspired  since,  which  
challenge  neoliberal  capitalism  and  advance  alternative  visions  of  political  organisation.  
Another  example  is  the  ‘burkini  ban’  in  South  French  towns  in  2016.  It  can  be  argued  that  
that  the  ban  crystallised  the  French  political  principle  of  laïcité  onto  the  very  bodies  of  its  
citizens.  In  this  way,  enforcing  the  ban  invoked  a  certain  model  of  the  French  citizen  and  
wearing  the  burkini  in  protest  challenged  this  model  and  advanced  a  ‘differentiated’  type  of  
French  citizenship  (c.f.  Young,  1989).    
  
To  conclude,  this  section  has  showed  that  social  psychological  research  can  provide  a  fresh  
perspective  to  the  study  of  citizenship  by  relating  it  to  the  politics  of  common-­‐sense  in  
everyday  micro-­‐interactions.  Critical  social  psychology,  in  particular,  shows  that  everyday  
life  is  a  domain  where  we  can  observe  in  mundane,  concrete  practices  the  dynamics  
between  the  habitual  and  transformative  dimensions  of  citizenship.  
  
  
5.  Conclusions    
  
The  paper  has  suggested  that  the  perspectives  of  citizens  have  been  routinely  absent  from  
analyses  of  citizenship,  with  the  effect  of  overlooking  the  ideological  underpinnings  of  
common-­‐sense  and  depoliticising  lay  political  actors.  The  depoliticization  of  everyday  
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common-­‐sense  can  become  a  political  tool  for  demagogic  rhetoric  and  can  serve  to  conceal  
the  ideological  foundations  of  politics.  But  a  critical  social  psychological  approach  does  not  
see  common-­‐sense  as  an  a-­‐political,  neutral  form  of  knowing;  it  sees  it  as  a  socially  
elaborated  and  contested  symbolic  resource  which  fuels  everyday  politics.  This  is  a  valuable  
contribution  to  citizenship  studies  which  have  recently  started  to  question  state-­‐centred  
approaches  and  to  engage  with  the  study  of  citizenship  from  the  perspectives  of  citizens  
themselves.  The  study  of  citizenship  can  also  benefit  social  psychology  by  steering  it  
towards  an  explicit  emphasis  on  the  political  dimensions  of  social  psychological  phenomena.  
At  a  more  fundamental  level,  social  psychology  would  benefit  from  revising  its  
understandings  of  the  ‘social’  to  consider  social  structures,  institutions  and  political  regimes  
alongside  more  symbolic  aspects  of  social  contexts.  
  
Considering  possible  directions  for  the  critical  social  psychology  of  citizenship,  a  promising  
way  forward  is  the  study  of  emerging  citizenships,  in  other  words,  the  study  of  new  political  
claims  and  struggles.  ‘Inspired’  from  disruptive  political  events,  such  as  the  election  of  
Trump,  Brexit,  and  the  rise  of  the  extreme  right  in  Europe  and  beyond,  scholars  have  started  
to  study  the  decline  of  the  existing  political  order  (such  as  neoliberal  capitalism)  and  the  
emergence  of  novel  political  configurations  and  cleavages.  This  changing  landscape  has  
given  rise  to  a  series  of  ‘unravellings’  (Andreouli,  Kaposi  &  Stenner,  2018)  whereby  
established  ideological  positions  (like  the  political  centre)  have  lost  their  certainty,  while  
other  previously  marginal  positions  have  gathered  momentum,  such  as  those  of  the  far  right  
and  left.  In  this  process,  political  values  become  rearticulated  in  new  and  unanticipated  
ways.  For  example,  representing  the  working  classes  against  the  interests  of  elites  has  
become  a  key  feature  of  far-­‐right  rhetoric.  In  these  movements,  the  language  of  the  left  has  
become  appropriated  and  forged  into  a  new  political  vision.  Here,  the  concept  of  
intersectionality  can  prove  quite  useful  as  it  points  to  the  complex  overlaps,  intersections  
and  tensions  of  political  positions.  A  fruitful  area  of  research  is,  more  broadly,  the  study  of  
emerging  political  subjectivities  and  ideologies.  As  discussed  in  previous  work  in  the  context  
of  the  UK  (Andreouli,  Kaposi  &  Stenner,  2018),  the  politics  of  Brexit  have  brought  to  the  fore  
and  emboldened  the  ‘affective  citizen’,  who  is  impassioned  and  conflictual,  against  the  
‘rational  citizen’  who  is  oriented  towards  consensus  and  detached  calculation.  These  two  
logics  are  not  just  a  matter  of  difference  of  opinions;  they  reflect  two  modes  of  engaging  
with  the  political  and  acting  as  a  political  agent.  Critical  social  psychology  can  explore  in  
more  detail  the  new  political  narratives  that  emerge  from  the  ‘cracks’  of  the  current  system  
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